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RECENT DECISIONS
Editor-EDWIN H. SHEPPARD
CONFLICT OF LAWS-RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER NEW JERSEY
STATUTE ENFORCEABLE IN NEW YORK.-A New Jersey statute, en-

acted in 1848, established a cause of action for death caused by the
negligence of another person. The statute provided that such a suit
must be brought in the name of the personal representatives, for the
exclusive benefit of widow, husband and next of kin. A supplemental statute, enacted in 1917, provides that every such action shall
be brought in the name of an administrator ad prosequenduln, who
shall have no authority to receive payment of the judgment, but that
payment shall be made only to a general administrator who has given
a bond as required by law and has complied with other procedural
prerequisites. The plaintiff was appointed administratrix ad prosequendum and also general administratrix by the surrogate in New
Jersey. The defendant argued that the plaintiff could not recover in
New York since there can be no collection of the judgment until the
general administratrix shall have filed a supplemental bond in New
Jersey, and since a judgment not susceptible of collection at the
hands of the plaintiff who recovers it is unknown to our law. Held,
the cause of action existing under the statute of New Jersey can be
maintained in New York. Wikoff v. Hirschel, 258 N. Y. 28, 179
N. E. 249 (1932).
This decision is in accord with the well settled rule that a cause
of action for wrongful death arising by virtue of a statute of another
state may be enforced in New York. Thus, in Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co.,' Cardozo, ., said: "A right of action is property. If a
foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact that we do not give a
like right is no reason for refusing to help the plaintiff in getting
what belongs to him. We are not so provincial as to say that every
solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at
home." 2 In that case the plaintiff was permitted to recover even
though the Massachusetts statute, on which he based his cause of
action, was in some respects penal in its nature. The courts have
declared that the right to sue under a foreign death statute rests on
the transitory obligation arising out of a personal injury which
follows the person, and for sound reasons of public policy may be
1

Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 110, 111, 120 N. E.
198, 201 (1918).
2 To the same effect, see Stallknecht v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 53 How.
Prac. 305, aff'd, 13 Hun 451 (N. Y. 1878) ; Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., 84 N. Y. 48 (1881); Wooden v. Western N. Y. & P. R.
Co., 126 N. Y. 10, 26 N. E. 1050 (1891); Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge Co.,
197 N. Y. 316, 90 N. E. 953 (1910).
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enforced wherever the person is found.3 However, jurisdiction is
discretionary in such cases. Thus, where the right of recovery given
by the foreign state is so dissimilar to that given by the law of the
state in which the action is brought as to be incapable of enforcement
in such state, the action cannot be maintained. The latter proposition
was applied in Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R. Co. 4 In that case the
district court refused to entertain jurisdiction because the foreign
statute sued on contemplated decree for periodical payments analogous to alimony, subject to modification from time to time as the
circumstances change. The main problem is to determine when the
right of action arising in the foreign state is so dissimilar to that
given by the state wherein the action is brought as to be against its
declared public policy. In the principal case, there was a mere procedural difficulty which could be overcome by staying enforcement of
judgment until plaintiff became qualified to collect it in accordance
with the New Jersey law. Since our Surrogate's Court Act 5 permits
such practice the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the facts stated in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action
was properly denied.
A.S.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RAILROAD REGULATION-APPLICATION
FOR REHEARING BECAUSE OF CHANGED ECONOMIC LEVEL SHOULD
BE GRANTED-JUDICIAL NOTICE WILL BE TAKEN OF DEPRESSION.-

Plaintiff railroad company sues to restrain enforcement of an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission made as a result of a general
investigation of rates, charges, regulations and practices as authorized
by the Hoch-Smith resolution. The record of the hearing before the
Commission was closed in September, 1928. An order of the Commission was reported on July 1, 1930. In February, 1931, before the
order was made effective, the plaintiff petitioned for a rehearing,
which was denied. This suit is brought to restrain the enforcement
of the order on the ground that the denial of the petition for rehearing was an abuse of administrative discretion and, consequently, a
denial of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, injunction should be granted. Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Company v. United States, 284 U. S. 248, 52 Sup.
Ct. 146 (1932).
'State

of Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921);

Zeikus v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 153 App. Div. 345, 138 N. Y. Supp. 478
(2d Dept. 1912).
' Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581 (1904).
'N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT §§89, 122.

